Digital Collections @ Dordt
Faculty Work Comprehensive List
3-28-2015

How Marion Helps Us to Understand Kierkegaard’s Fear and
Trembling
Mark Tazelaar
Dordt College, mark.tazelaar@dordt.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcollections.dordt.edu/faculty_work
Part of the Catholic Studies Commons, Continental Philosophy Commons, and the Religious Thought,
Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons

Recommended Citation
Tazelaar, M. (2015). How Marion Helps Us to Understand Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling. Retrieved
from https://digitalcollections.dordt.edu/faculty_work/225

This Conference Presentation is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Collections @ Dordt. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Work Comprehensive List by an authorized administrator of Digital Collections @
Dordt. For more information, please contact ingrid.mulder@dordt.edu.

How Marion Helps Us to Understand Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling
Abstract
In the past decade, many interpretations of Fear and Trembling highlight the significance of the
“eschatological”—the marvel of Abraham’s expectation that he will get Isaac back. For these
interpretations, the central issue is the contrast between the knight of faith and the knight of resignation.
Merold Westphal, however, contends that these interpretations lead us away from the main contrast
between the hero of faith and the tragic hero. Kierkegaard scholarship is at an impasse. I argue that
Marion’s phenomenology of sacrifice, together with the important idea of veritas redarguens that he
appropriates from Augustine, offer insights that can resolve the impasse facing Kierkegaard scholars.
Primary is the insight that the ordeal of Abraham shares central features with the ordeal of truth (veritas
redarguens), both of which are ultimately ordeals of love. In that ordeal, Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac is his
loving disposition to receive Isaac by returning him to givenness.
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In his essay, “Sketch of a Phenomenological Concept of Sacrifice,” Marion
proposes an understanding of sacrifice that should be welcomed by scholars of
Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling. I will argue that Marion’s understanding not
only can help us to understand Fear and Trembling better, but in so doing breaks
an impasse that has developed among recent Kierkegaard scholars. This may be
surprising, since Marion never mentions Kierkegaard by name or even by indirect
reference throughout his essay. I will leave speculation on why that is for another
time.
Concerning the first point – that Marion helps us to be better readers of
Kierkegaard – I offer the following two comments as introduction:
1) Sacrifice, Marion points out, literally means, “to make sacred”; if this is so,
however, then most traditional models of sacrifice fail to account for how
that might be. He considers models in which destruction of the thing
sacrificed is primary, as well as models of retribution and the economy of
exchange. Marion provides reasons to be dissatisfied with each of these
understandings. In contrast to them, Marion argues that sacrifice should be
understood within the framework of the gift, suggesting that an act of
sacrifice does not entail or encourage the destruction of that which is
sacrificed. Neither is a sacrifice effectively accomplished through
dispossession of a good. Sacrifice must be thought precisely in its relation
to the gift. “Sacrifice presupposes a gift already given, the point of which is
neither destruction, its undoing, nor even its transfer to another owner,
but, instead, its return to the givenness from which it proceeds, and whose
mark it should always bear.” This analysis is important for Kierkegaard
scholars because, as we will see, they operate on an understanding of
sacrifice which implies that the sacrifice is that which is either destroyed,
undone, or transferred to another – in the case of Isaac, that the
willingness to sacrifice Isaac in obedience to God’s command means to be
willing to destroy Isaac.
2) I suggest that Marion’s “Sketch” brings to light passages and themes in Fear
and Trembling that have been minimized, marginalized, or downright

overlooked (Though it might be hard to imagine that any phrase in Fear and
Trembling has been overlooked at this point). Time permitting, I will
suggest that there are structural parallels between Marion’s analysis of
sacrifice, and the structure that guides the unfolding of the message of Fear
and Trembling. Most importantly, though, I suggest that Kierkegaard’s
conception of sacrifice is closer to that of Marion than it is to Kierkegaard’s
interpreters.
The parallels are not easy to detect, however, for two reasons:
1) Kierkegaard did not have available to him the sophisticated
phenomenological tools developed by Marion (and earlier
phenomenologists),
2) Fear and Trembling is very much a polemical work – an “attack on
Christendom” – as well as part of Kierkegaard’s indirect discourse. As part
of the pseudonymous authorship, it does not present Kierkegaard’s own
thoughts directly (as he does, for example, in his Upbuilding Discourses).
What sacrifice is, is a central question of the book (and how an act of
sacrifice is an act of faith). Interpreters of Kierkegaard have allowed certain
assumptions about sacrifice to skew their interpretations of what faith is. I
suggest that Kierkegaard does not share those assumptions, though the
polemical nature of the book makes it difficult to see that.
Concerning the second point – that Marion’s analyses can help us to understand
Fear and Trembling in a way that breaks the impasse between prominent
Kierkegaard scholars – let me briefly describe that impasse.
For almost 30 years now, Kierkegaard scholars have spilt ink responding to
Alasdair MacIntyre’s argument that Abraham’s faith, on Kierkegaard’s telling, is
little more than blind obedience and irrational fanaticism. The interpretations
that have developed, however, have, over the course of that time, fallen into two
distinct camps, and have led to an impasse. This impasse threatens to undercut
confidence in these interpretations as responses to MacIntyre. I will take John

Davenport, on one hand, and Merold Westphal, on the other, as representatives
of the major contending interpretations.
Davenport offers what he calls an “eschatological” interpretation of FT, claiming
that what he calls “eschatological trust” is the distinguishing element of faith in
FT. He says,
I believe the main point that Kierkegaard hoped to convey through Silentio has been
largely missed…The main point as Alastair Hannay explains, depends on the idea that
Abraham’s “special greatness was that, in doing what did (starting to sacrifice Isaac), he
did not doubt that he would get Isaac back, at least have him restored, whatever he did,
even to the point of killing him.”

Later in the same article he says,
In short, Abraham’s love of God and obedience to God (which are ultimately equivalent)
are vital aspects of his faith in God, but the intentional object of that faith is Isaac’s
surviving to fulfill God’s initial promise to Abraham and Sarah: the core of faith is trust
in divine fulfillment of an ethically ideal outcome that seems absurd or impossible to
human reason, because it is beyond the human actor’s power to secure (by his or her
own agency) given the circumstances.
In opposition to “higher ethics” readings (that faith is obedience to divine commands, or
obligations to others transcending rational expression in universal norms) the
eschatological account of faith says that faith consists primarily in trust that the highest
ethical ideals will be fulfilled by God as God promises us.

The primary features of Davenport’s position is that the contrast between the
knight of infinite resignation and the knight of faith, and the knight of faith’s
double movement of “giving up” and “taking back,” are central to the message of
the book. Abraham’s faith is not centered in his obedience to God’s command to
sacrifice Isaac, but in his trust that Isaac will be returned to him. In fact, for
Davenport the command to sacrifice Isaac constitutes the obstacle that Abraham
faces in his love for Isaac. Though Abraham is willing to obey, the sacrifice is an
obstacle that threatens his loving relationship with Isaac. He refers to God’s
command as “mysterious and terrible.” And yet, says Davenport, Abraham has

faith that sacrificing Isaac will not mean permanently ending his life in this world –
but only because his faith is eschatologically directed toward and fulfilled by
divine action.
The sacrifice, in other words, IS directed toward permanently ending Isaac’s life in
this world. But Abraham has FAITH that Isaac will nonetheless be returned to him
(by God) despite taking steps to sacrifice him.
Representing the other side of the impasse is Merold Westphal. According to
Westphal, Davenport’s eschatological reading of faith leans too heavily on the
contrast between the knight of infinite resignation and the knight of faith to
determine the main message of the book. For Westphal, this contrast is merely
preliminary. The point of the book is achieved through the later contrast between
the hero of faith – Abraham – and the tragic hero (such as Agamemnon). For the
main message of the book, according to Westphal, is centered in its attack on
Christendom, and in that attack the fundamental categories are “is it murder or is
it sacrifice?” and not “loss and return.”
Furthermore, says Westphal, the knight of infinite resignation is a hero in the eyes
of Silentio. I find this to be an incredibly odd argument, since the tragic hero is
also a hero for Silentio – furthermore, Silentio identifies with the tragic hero even
before he develops his account of the knight of infinite resignation. Westphal is
right, however, to worry that Davenport’s interpretation leads him to see sacrifice
as nothing but an obstacle to his ongoing love for Isaac.
Hopefully we now have a sense of the impasse: there is a conflict in the
interpretations between which contrast (the knight of infinite resignation/knight
of faith, on one hand, and the tragic hero/hero of faith, on the other) should be
taken as primary and central to the message of the book. In each interpretation,
the opposite contrast is subordinated to what is taken as the central contrast.
But I think we are faced with a neither/nor here. Both contrasts are central to the
“attack on Christendom” that is indeed a central focus of the book – one no less
than the other. In terms of the polemic of the book, these two contrasts are

subordinate to the operative metaphor of tower-building that weaves its way
throughout the book.
The tower metaphor appears already at the end of the Preface, where Silentio
says, “This is not the System; it hasn’t the slightest thing to do with the system. I
wish all good luck on the System and the Danish shareholders in that Omnibus,
for it will hardly become a tower.” Taken alone, this seems an odd statement.
This tower-talk may seem to be merely literary flourish – Fear and Trembling is a
lyric after all, even if a dialectical one. But the force of the metaphor comes home
in Problema Two, when we recall that the tower metaphor is used in Luke 14 by
Christ, in the context of describing the cost of discipleship. “Whoever does not
hate his father and mother and wife and children and brothers and sisters, yes,
and even his own life, he cannot be my disciple.” Tower-building, Christ says, is
not something one should undertake without sitting down to calculate the cost.
Woven through all the discussion of Abraham is this metaphor from Luke 14.
Between these two instances of the tower metaphor, we find this description of
the knight of faith, which, like the mention of towers in the Preface, can sound
strange when taken in isolation. “On the road he [the knight of faith] passes a
building-site and meets another man. They talk together for a moment, and he
has a building/tower raised in a jiffy, having all that’s needed for that. The
stranger leaves him, thinking, “That must have been a capitalist,” while my
admirable knight thinks, “Yes, if it came to that I could surely manage it.” If it
came to that.
What Kierkegaard is suggesting through his pseudonym Silentio, I would suggest,
is that neither the knight of infinite resignation nor the tragic hero are fit for
tower building.
What, then, makes the knight of faith fit? What does “if it came to that I could
manage it” mean? I want to suggest that tower building requires humility, and
humility’s way of collecting its materials. It does not rush forward, but

nonetheless can do it – if it comes to that – when the time is right – neither too
soon nor too late – all phrases used with respect to Abraham at one point or
another throughout the book. So what does this mean, and why does it require
humility in particular?
To answer this I must fill in Marion’s sketch of sacrifice. To repeat what I said at
the outset:
Marion argues that sacrifice should be understood within the framework of the
gift, suggesting that an act of sacrifice does not entail, invite, or encourage the
destruction of that which is sacrificed. Neither is a sacrifice effectively
accomplished through the dispossession of a good. Sacrifice must be thought
precisely in its relation to the gift. “Sacrifice presupposes a gift already given, the
point of which is neither destruction, its undoing, nor even its transfer to another
owner, but, instead, its return to the givenness from which it proceeds, and
whose mark it should always bear.” Each of the phrases I stated above – “if it
comes to that – when the time is right – neither too soon nor too late” – are ways
of bearing that mark. How?
Sacrifice gives the gift back to the givenness from which it proceeds, returning the
gift to the return that constitutes it. Sacrifice does not separate itself from the gift
but dwells in it totally. Like Kierkegaard, there is a double movement: the gift is
returned (even abandoned), but abandoned to the givenness from which it
proceeds. It is not as though sacrifice is one pole of the double movement of
giving up/taking back; sacrifice is the double movement itself. Sacrifice does not
return the given to the giver by depriving the recipient of the gift; instead, it
makes givenness visible, all the more so in that it makes Abraham recover the
posture of reception.
What Abraham hears in the command to sacrifice Isaac is not simply an
imperative to return Isaac but also the necessity to recover the posture of
reception, which he can only do by returning Isaac. He does not suppress the gift

that is Isaac, but makes this gift newly transparent, allowing to appear the
coming-over that delivers the gift into the visible.
The sacrifice is accomplished, then, not averted or avoided, insofar as Abraham
recovers this posture of reception. Abraham continues to live in expectancy.
Is there textual evidence in Fear and Trembling for anything like Marion’s
analysis? I believe there is. Immediately prior to the descriptions of the knight of
infinite resignation and the knight of faith, we find the following passage:
“I do not burden God with my petty cares, details don’t concern me. I gaze only
upon my love and keep its virginal flame pure and clear; faith is convinced that
God troubles himself about the smallest thing. In this life I am content to be
wedded to the left hand, faith is humble enough to demand the right; and that it
is indeed humility I don’t, and shall never, deny.”
The right hand/left hand conceit was a favorite image of Kierkegaard’s, and it
appears in many forms throughout his works. It appears in Concluding
Unscientific Postscript with reference to Lessing’s famous parable of the choice
between full knowledge of the truth (right hand) and the perpetual quest toward
truth (left hand). Lessing says that “out of humility” he would choose the left
hand. Humility in Fear and Trembling is associated with the right hand however,
and Kierkegaard’s own view on the matter is apparently expressed in a journal
entry, in which he criticizes Lessing on this point as “really a kind of selfishness
[that] can easily become a dangerous, yes, a presumptuous error” – in other
words, an error of pride.
In Fear and Trembling, the humility of faith is understood on analogy with being
wed with the right hand. The left hand/right hand conceit refers, I believe, to the
old practice of the morganatic marriage, which is a marriage between people of
unequal social rank, in which, according to the marriage contract, the wife (and
any progeny) can make no claim on the husband’s titles or rights. The “humble”
station of the wife is the basis for renouncing such claims. In the wedding
ceremony, the groom would hold the bride’s right hand with his left hand.

However, in this passage, faith is represented by the bride that demands the right
hand – and as Silentio says, “that [this demand] is indeed humility I don’t, and
shall never, deny.” If faith is this demand, this courage (as Silentio also calls it),
then it is a humble courage – far removed from what Marion calls the “selfappropriation of autarchy” which seeks to rid itself of a possession by destroying
it and thus becoming free of it (which parallels some of the patterns of the knight
of infinite resignation).
The “right hand”, one could say, is the right hand of God, and it is Kierkegaard’s
way of referring, with the conceptual tools he had available to him, to what
Marion calls givenness. Abraham, in sacrificing Isaac, is, in effect, placing him into
God’s right hand. What on the next page Silentio describes as Abraham’s
“narrow-mindedness” (the humble courage that insists it cannot live without
every gift dispensed from God’s right hand), is what Marion calls the recovery of
the posture of reception.
Indeed, we can now say that the sacrifice demanded of Abraham intends the
posture of reception. So understood, sacrifice constitutes the deepest intimacy
with both God and his gifts. Far from being a mysterious and terrifying obstacle
that threatens to dispossess Abraham of his son, the sacrifice returns Isaac to the
givenness from which he proceeds. The sacrifice, as I said earlier, is not avoided or
averted at the last minute, but is completed, because Isaac is placed into God’s
right hand.
For both Marion and Kierkegaard, the point of sacrifice is not to separate yourself
from that which you sacrifice, for the sake of something else (which you might
receive in return or in exchange, perhaps as a reward); nor is the sacrifice solely
for the sake of a closer relationship with the one to whom you made the sacrifice.
The point of the sacrifice is to draw you closer to both gift and giver, so that you
may dwell more deeply within those relations than you ever could were you not
to undertake the sacrifice.

Notes for Discussion:
Attunement – wrestling with pure obedience as destruction
Knight of Infinite Resignation – self-appropriation of autarchy (taking Isaac back
again only with pain)
Tragic hero – economies of exchange or retribution
Marion’s understanding of sacrifice as returning to the gift its givenness is the
implicit understanding of sacrifice governing throughout the text – An
understanding into which one is invited to step in – some of the invitations being
by way of the metaphor of tower-building and its anchorage in the text of Luke
14.
The sacrifice makes visible Isaac’s givenness, testifying to it, trusting it and even
insisting upon it in the humble posture of the recipient.
As Silentio says in the Third Problema, “Should his contemporaries – if one can
call them that – not say: There is an eternal procrastinating with Abraham; when
he finally gets a son – and that took long enough – he wants to sacrifice him; he
must be demented.”
Of course Silentio sees and understands the tragic hero, but he doesn’t want to go
there, and his analyses show that the tragic hero is not Abraham in any case. He
knows that as a knight of infinite resignation he is no tower-builder any more than
the tragic hero is. What is it that he finds himself incapable of performing and
believing? Is it that he is incapable of adopting the posture of reception?
Incapable of living in the “if it came to that” and in the “eternal procrastination”
of Abraham.
H lacks humble courage – in order to work up the strength necessary to offer
Isaac to God he must resign Isaac completely. He cannot understand sacrifice to
be anything other than an act of destruction, and once he has destroyed Isaac,
then how can he take him back in joy, without pain?

